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THE THREAT OF TREBLE DAMAGE
ANTITRUST CLAIMS AGAINST
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association v. Abbott Laboratories1
State and local governments are concerned for many reasons about the
extent to which the antitrust laws2 apply to them and what remedies exist
when the laws are applicable.3 The Sherman Ac authorizes suits against
state and local governments. 5 In Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association
v. Abbott Laboratories,' the Supreme Court held that the sale of pharmaceuti-
cals to state and local government hospitals for resale in competition with pri-
vate pharmacies is not exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act.7 Thus, a trade
association of retail pharmacists was allowed to bring a price discrimination
suit against the University of Alabama and Cooper Green Hospital.5
1. 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983).
2. The phrase "antitrust laws" is defined in section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 12 (1982). It is used here to refer to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-20, 21, 22-27 (1982), and the Robin-
son-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982).
3. The question of most concern is whether the treble damage provision, 15
U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) will apply. See notes 80-90 and accompanying text infra.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) (prohibits monopolization and attempts to
monopolize).
5. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,
46-48 (1982) (district court may issue preliminary injunction against enforcement of
city ordinance which was potential violation of the Sherman Act); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 733, 791-92 (1975) (enforcement of minimum fee schedules by
state bar association within antitrust scrutiny).
6. 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983).
7. Id. at 1014. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan, Rehnquist and
Stevens, dissented. Id. at 1025-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She found that the busi-
ness and legal communities traditionally believed that the Robinson-Patman Act did
not apply to local governments, id. at 1025, 1030, and that therefore, the Court should
not hold that they do absent a clearly expressed legislative intent for application. Id. at
1028-29 & n.10. The majority took the position that the plain language of the statute
indicates that there should be no exemption, and therefore, the law will be applied
absent a clearly expressed legislative intent for exemption. Id. at 1016. While Jefferson
County appears to be a debate over legislative history, both sides agree that Congress
never considered the point. Id. at 1017-18 & n.18; id. at 1028 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). Since a decision either way is arbitrary, the implications of the holdings are more
interesting than how the Court reached them.
8. 103 S. Ct. at 1023. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b & 21a
(1982), prohibits the selling of similar goods to purchasers at different prices unless the
differential can be cost justified or reflect changing market conditions. Id. § 13(a). The
hospital pharmacies were sued under id. § 13(f), which prohibits purchasers from re-
1
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Jefferson County authorizes suits against local governments under the
Robinson-Patman Act? and, implicitly, the Clayton Act"0 as well. The case
fails, however, to resolve two important issues. First, to what extent do the
antitrust laws apply to state and local governments? That is, will the same
standards of antitrust enforcement be applied to local governments as apply to
private defendants, and if not, what standards will apply? Second, in those
cases in which the antitrust laws do apply to state and local governments what
remedies are appropriate?
The antitrust laws generally prohibit "any person" from engaging in pro-
scribed conduct," and the Court has held that this phrase includes state and
local governments.' 2 Thus, if the Court declines to hold a state or city liable on
a specific fact situation, it will be very difficult to impose liability on a simi-
larly situated private defendant.' 3 To avoid creating an unwanted exemption
for private defendants, any exemption for state and local governments' 4 should
be grounded on some inherent characteristic of a state or local government as
a defendant.
Federalism is a very plausible basis for such an exemption. The tenth
amendment' 5 is a constitutional expression of federalism' 6 that prevents Con-
ceiving or inducing discriminatory prices.
The University, which the Court treated as "the State itself," operated two phar-
macies in its medical center. 103 S. Ct. at 1013, 1014 n.5. Cooper Green Hospital is a
county hospital that operates a pharmacy. Id. at 1013.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1982).
10. The Robinson-Patman Act amended the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13,
14-20, 21 & 22-27 (1982), and thus the definitional provisions are the same. 103 S. Ct.
at 1015 & n.13.
11. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (combinations in restraint of trade); id. § 13(discriminatory pricing).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 1015 & n.10 (municipalities are "persons" under the antitrust
laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light, 435 U.S. 389, 397 & n.14 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("person" in Sherman and
Clayton Acts includes municipal governments both as plaintiffs and defendants).
13. While this appears to be a "slippery slope" argument, it really is not. The
argument is that there is no basis in the statutory language for treating private and
government defendants differently. While the Court can find factual distinctions, it
would be obvious when it applied a different standard to governments.
14. Justice Rehnquist has suggested that the issue is really one of preemption
rather than exemption. Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,
60-71 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He concluded, therefore, that where Congress
did intend to preempt a state's right to regulate competition, any conflicting state law
would be void, but the state could never actually violate the antitrust laws. Id. at 64-65.
This analysis assumes that because Congress intended to preempt state law they did
not intend the federal law to apply to states. There is no apparent basis for this as-
sumption. Indeed, the more logical assumption is that, by preempting, Congress did
intend the law to apply to the states. To rebut Justice Rehnquist's argument, however,
one need only recognize that the preemption issue is not determinative of the exemption
issue.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
16. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (tenth amendment
2
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gress from excessively restricting state17 and local' s governments' sovereignty.
The Court has defined the tenth amendment constraints with a three-part
test.'9 For commerce clause legislation 20 to be invalid it must first regulate the
states as states.21 The Court has had little difficulty with this prong, generally
finding that it exists where the regulation dictates how a state conducts its own
affairs 2 but not where the regulation affects only private conduct 23 or how a
state may regulate private conduct. 24 This requirement would be met in Jeffer-
son County because the state' 5 was sued for obtaining discriminatory prices
for itself.' 6
The second prong of the tenth amendment test requires that the federal
regulation address an "indisputable attribute of state sovereignty. '"" The
Court has not clearly defined this phrase, but it appears to be rather limited. It
does not, for example, even include all of a state's employment decisions. 28
declares that "Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system").
17. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926).
18. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 & n.20 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion).
19. Hodel v. Viriginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
287-88 (1981).
20. The Court has held that the same tenth amendment constraints may not
apply to legislation enacted pursuant to other constitutional grants of power, such as
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1064
n.18 (1983). The degree of state protection afforded by the tenth amendment is appar-
ently dependent on when the constitutional provision purportedly authorizing the fed-
eral legislation was adopted relative to the tenth amendment. Thus, the fifteenth
amendment allows federal regulation of voting which might otherwise violate the tenth
amendment. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 (1980); see also
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (eleventh amendment limited by the
fourteenth amendment).
21. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287; Usery, 426
U.S. at 854.
22. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 106f.
23. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-50 & 262
(1964) (commerce power legislation requiring private owners of public accomodations
to serve minorities need be only reasonably adapted to congressional end of vindicating
deprivation of dignity caused by denial of equal access).
24. E.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289-90 (tenth amendment does not prevent Con-
gress from proscribing minimum regulations governing surface coal mining and requir-
ing the states to implement the regulations themselves or submit to the federal
regulation).
25. The Board of Curators of the University of Alabama was treated as the
state. See note 8 supra.
26. 103 S. Ct. at 1013 n.2.
27. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88; Usery,
426 U.S. at 845.
28. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061 n. 1l (only employment decisions
that are vehicles for a state's exercise of its core sovereign functions or are clearly
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The Court explicitly held in Jefferson County that the retail sale of
pharmaceuticals is not an indisputable attribute of state sovereignty.2 9
The final prong of the tenth amendment test requires that the federal
regulation directly impair the state's ability to structure the integral operations
of a traditional governmental function. 30 This portion of the test may be no
more than an alternative statement of the "indisputable attribute of state sov-
ereignty" requirement of the second prong.3 The third prong, however, is
more difficult to analyze.3 2
The structural integrational operations element was first articulated in
National League of Cities v. Usery." Although the Court still uses the Usery
language,34 it appears to apply a narrower test.35 For federal commerce power
regulations to conflict with the tenth amendment, they may now have to ad-
dress what ends a state seeks to achieve,'3 rather than simply address how a
state structures its operations in pursuit of those ends.'7 If strictly followed,
this test would virtually eliminate the states' tenth amendment protections.
Federal commerce power legislation would be invalid only if it wholly pre-
vented a state from exercising a sovereign function.' 8 Thus, even if supplying
pharmaceuticals was a sovereign function,'" the state and local governments in
29. 103 S. Ct. at 1014 n.6.
30. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288; Usery, 426
U.S. at 843.
31. Usery dealt with the concepts interchangeably. 426 U.S. at 851 & n.16. But
see EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061 n.l 1 (although management of state parks
is a traditional governmental function, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982), is constitutional because it does not directly impair the
states' ability to structure that function). The Court specifically declined, however, to
decide whether the Act addresses an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty. 103 S.
Ct. at 1061.
32. Although several tenth amendment cases have been decided on this prong,
see EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061-64; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,
769-70 (1982); Usery, 426 U.S. at 852, the Court has yet to articulate a clear standard
for its application. The standards the Court has announced, such as threatening a
state's "separate and independent existence," EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062,
are of little analytical value.
33. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
34. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
35. Usery held that minimum wage and maximum hour provisions could not be
constitutionally imposed on state employees. 426 U.S. at 839-40. EEOC v. Wyoming
held that Congress could prohibit states from imposing mandatory retirement on game
wardens. 103 S. Ct. at 1064. It is difficult to see a constitutional distinction between
these regulations.
36. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at
771.
37. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 849-50.
38. The Court surely did not intend for this test to be taken literally. It would
permit Congress to regulate, for example, how a state conducts its police and emer-
gency services as long as the state is not entirely prevented from achieving its ultimate
goals.
39. In Jefferson County, the Court noted that supplying pharmaceuticals is not
1984]
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Jefferson County would not receive tenth amendment protection under the
new standard because the Robinson-Patman Act does not require them to
abandon that goal. Under the old standard, there is at least a plausible argu-
ment that the third prong is met in Jefferson County. If supplying
pharmaceuticals was a sovereign function,40 preventing states from obtaining
discriminatory prices would arguably impair the states' financial ability to per-
form that function.4
1
Even where all three prongs of the test are met, the Court will balance
the federal and state interests before invalidating federal commerce power leg-
islation under the tenth amendment.42 While the Court has not clearly said
what factors it will consider, the indication is that it will simply weigh the
policies underlying the state and federal interest, with no presumption in favor
of either.43
The tenth amendment provides a legitimate basis for treating state and
local governments differently than private defendants in some federal antitrust
actions. If the tenth amendment provided state and local governments' with
their sole protection from the antitrust laws, however, much of their social and
economic legislation would be subject to judicial scrutiny,4 4 in a manner remi-
niscent of the Lochner 5 era. Antitrust review is perhaps even more trouble-
some than declaring legislation invalid under fourteenth amendment substan-
tive due process, 46 because local governments may be faced with treble
a sovereign function. 103 S. Ct. at 1014 n.6.
40. Supplying pharmaceuticals to indigents might be a sovereign function. 103
S. Ct. at 1014 n.7.
41. Although the Court has said that financial burden is not a key to this con-
stitutional issue, EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063; Usery, 426 U.S. at 851; it
certainly spent a great deal of time discussing the financial impact before making the
constitutional ruling. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063; Usery, 426 U.S. at 846-
49. The Court may be deciding the issue on financial criteria and justifying the deci-
sion on vague notions of "structuring integral operations." This rationale would explain
the apparent inconsistency between EEOC v. Wyoming and Usery. See note 35 supra.
42. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29.
43. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063-64 & n.17 (articulated but did
not reach the balancing test).
44. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text infra.
45. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner and its progeny
allowed the Court to act as a superlegislature, balancing the individual's right to con-
tract, as found in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, against the
reasonableness of the states' exercise of police power. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 14-21 (1980) (suggesting that "substantive due process is a contradiction in
terms). See generally Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Em-
brasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 435 (1973) (discussing the develop-
ment and decline of the Lochner approach to invalidating economic regulation). The
state and local government antitrust issue is analogous because absent significant tenth
amendment protections the Court must simply balance the states' exercise of police
power against the congressional policy of promoting competition.
46. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
[Vol. 49
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damage claims.4 7 For the Court to avoid reviewing the merits of state legisla-
tion while maintaining the integrity of the antitrust laws with respect to pri-
vate defendants, it must find an exemption that is as principled as the tenth
amendment rationale yet much broader.
The state action doctrine may be a partial answer. In its first articulation
of this doctrine, the Court held simply that Congress did not intend the Sher-
man Ac 8 to apply to state action or action directed by a state.4 9 The Court
has since clarified the doctrine to apply only where the state, acting as sover-
eign, has compelled rather than merely prompted5" or consented to51 anticom-
petitive activity. Further, the state must clearly express its policy and actively
supervise the activity. 2
Although the Court's expression of the state action doctrine has changed,
the underlying theme has not. If the state is making policy decisions in its
sovereign capacity and closely supervising the implementation of those poli-
cies, the Court will likely apply the state action doctrine.5 3 As the relationship
between the anticompetitive activities and the state becomes attenuated, so
does the Court's willingness to apply the doctrine.
5 4
Municipal or county legislation, however, is not necessarily an expression
of state policy for purposes of state action antitrust immunity.5 5 Similarly, im-
plementation of legislation by a local government does not constitute active
state supervision. 56 Although local governments are given less state action im-
munity than a state, it is not clear how much less. City of Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co.5" indicates that local governments are entitled to more
immunity than private parties.5 8 Private anticompetitive activities are shielded
47. See notes 106-13 and accompanying text infra.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
49. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (state adopted and enforced
raisin-marketing plan not subject to antitrust scrutiny).
50. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (state bar mini-
mum fee schedules not entitled to antitrust immunity because they were merely sug-
gested, rather than required, by the state supreme court).
51. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976) (state approval of
private utility rates, which included potentially anticompetitive activity, did not shield
the activity from antitrust scrutiny).
52. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977) (disciplinary rules regarding
lawyer advertising exempt from antitrust laws because they were promulgated and en-
forced by the state supreme court).
53. See id.
54. See note 50 supra.
55. City of Lafayette v. Lousiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. 389, 410-11 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (city not automatically entitled to state action exemption because of
its status as a state subdivision). This conclusion apparently was based on legislative
intent. Id. at 413.
56. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53
(1982) (city's implementation of cable television moratorium ordinance does not consti-
tute state action).
57. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
58. Id. at 410 n.40 (Cantor dealt with private parties and is not applicable to
1984] 639
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from antitrust scrutiny when they are undertaken pursuant to clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed state policy and are conducted under active
state supervision. 9 Local governments, however, are entitled to the state ac-
tion exemption when they are acting as the government and pursuant to state
policy to displace competition.60
There are two implications. First, because the emphasis is on state policy
with no mention of state supervision, local governments may not have to meet
the active state supervision prong required of private defendants. 1 This is im-
portant because local governments frequently enact potentially anticompetitive
laws, such as zoning and licensing ordinances, without state supervision.6 2 Sec-
ond, the "pursuant to state policy" language of Lafayette appears to be a
lower standard than "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed." The im-
plication is that in delegating authority to local governments states need only
contemplate, rather than explicitly authorize, specific anticompetitive
conduct.63
Following this rationale, granting a home-rule charter to a city could be a
sufficiently broad delegation of authority to immunize a variety of anticompe-
titive activities, such as allocating the city's cable television market."4 This was
not the result reached in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boul-
der.6 5 The Boulder Court held that actions of local governments are not im-
mune under the state action doctrine unless they are in furtherance of a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. 6 Although Boul-
der purportedly relies on precedent, it is a clear change of direction. 7 Local
cases involving municipal defendants).
59. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412.
60. Id. at 413.
61. The lower courts seem to be adopting this position. See Gold Cross Ambu-
lance & Transfer v. City of Kan. City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1014-15 & n.13 (1983) (no
state supervision required to city providing ambulance service).
62. State supervision cannot be implied from a mere grant of authority. Boul-
der, 455 U.S. at 52-56 (home-rule charter does not constitute state supervision). But
see Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1015 (requiring state supervision would be "duplicative,
wasteful regulation").
63. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
64. There are two types of home rule. Both forms allow municipal governments
to act without enabling legislation from the state, as long there is no specific state
denial of authorization. The distinguishing characteristic is the way they deal with di-
rect conflicts between state and municipal laws. The first method allows the municipal
charter to supersede state law in areas of local concern, while state law always super-
sedes the municipal charter under the second method. Westbrook, Municipal Home
Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience, 33 Mo. L. REv. 45, 74-79 (1968).
Under either type, the state could surely be said to have "contemplated" that the local
government would regulate the cable television market.
65. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
66. Id. at 52.
67. See id. at 51-52 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U.S. 96 (1978); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410). Although Lafayette used the "clearly
[Vol. 49
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governments are now no more exempt from the antitrust laws than private
defendants, though they may not be required to show active state
supervision. 8
Virtually all of a city's traditional functions are subject to scrutiny under
the present application of the antitrust laws. 9 Consider a convenience store
opening in a residential neighborhood. The local residents do not like retail
businesses coming into the area, so they petition the city council for a zoning
ordinance to prevent additional retail development. By passing the ordinance,
the council gives the existing store an effective monopoly and opens itself to
antitrust liability. The city would have no tenth amendment protection in this
case because the antitrust laws do not regulate the states as states, but merely
define how the state (city) may regulate private conduct. Further, there is no
state action exemption because the zoning policy was neither clearly articu-
lated nor affirmatively expressed by the state. 0
A city that issues a limited number of licenses to sell liquor is in a similar
situation. Restricting the total number of retail establishments is a clear re-
straint on trade.7 1 Again, the antitrust law would not be regulating the states
as states, so there would be no tenth amendment protection, and there is no
state involvement to invoke the state action doctrine.
A final example concerns ambulance service. To quicken emergency re-
sponse time, a city buys sufficient ambulance equipment to serve the entire
city and then contracts with a single operator. To ensure the success of the
system, the city bans all other ambulance companies from operating within the
city. Without specific state authorization for such a plan, the city is not enti-
tled to state-action immunity.7 2 The city, however, may be entitled to tenth
articulated and affirmatively expressed" language, the Court referred to private defen-
dants, and specifically stated that the test is not necessarily applicable to governmental
defendants. Id. at 410 n.40. Lafayette held that local governments are exempt when
acting "pursuant to state policy to displace competition." Id. at 414. While Fox used
the clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed standard, the Court actually dis-
cussed the state action exemption with respect to a specific act of the California legisla-
ture rather than the defendant Board established under the act. 439 U.S. at 109. Thus,
Fox stands for the general proposition that the California legislature may choose to
displace competition and, impliedly, that the Board was acting within the scope of the
legislature's choice. Midcal also required the clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed standard, 445 U.S. at 105, but is entirely consistent with Lafayette since the
defendant was a private trade association. 445 U.S. at 102 n.5.
68. See note 61 and accompanying text supra..
69. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
70. The Court has upheld zoning laws against due process challenges. Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396-97 (1927). This result, however, has
no bearing on the antitrust issue of whether the state specifically authorized the local
government to enact a given ordinance.
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1983) (prohibiting monopolies or attempts to
monopolize).
72. See Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kan. City, 705 F.2d
1005, 1011 (1983). A general state authorization, such as granting a home-rule char-
1984]
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amendment protection.
By outlawing the city's regulation of ambulance services, the antitrust
laws are addressing the state as a state, 73 thus satisifying the first prong of the
tenth amendment test.74 Although the undoubted attribute of state sovereignty
prong is not as clear, providing quality ambulance service would come within a
city's function of protecting public health. 75 Moreover, the antitrust laws, if
enforced, would impair the city's ability to structure an integral operation in a
traditional governmental function.76 Since the service can be run most effec-
tively as a monopoly, the antitrust laws would not only regulate how the city
seeks to achieve its goals, 7" but could in practice prevent it from obtaining
those goals.7 8 If the city could survive all three prongs of the tenth amendment
test, it would likely survive the final balancing test as well. The well-defined
state interest in providing quality ambulance care would surely outweigh the
generalized federal interest in promoting competition.
Thus, local governments have state action immunity only where the state
has specifically authorized an activity and tenth amendment protection only
when performing a core sovereign function. Since this leaves cities exposed to
many antitrust claims, it is appropriate to ask what remedies they may face.
Section 16 of the Clayton Act"0 allows injunctive relief. This applies to
both state and local governments. 8' Section 4 of the Clayton Act" provides
that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall re-
cover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."8 3 Section 4A 4 is worded similarly, but limits recov-
ter, would be insufficient. See note 62 supra.
73. For tenth amendment purposes, political subdivisions are equivalent to
states. Usery, 426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
74. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287.
75. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 851 & n.16.
76. See Gold Cross, 705 F.2d at 1014 n.13 (ambulance service is a traditional
governmental function).
77. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062 (to violate the tenth amendment, the
federal regulation must address more than the way in which a state seeks to achieve its
goals).
78. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 771 (federal law cannot compel the exer-
cise of a state's sovereign powers).
79. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1064 n.17. This result is by no means
certain, however. The Court could determine that the national economic interest in
promoting competition outweighs the local health concerns. As suggested at note 45
supra, the Court would be acting as a legislature, and predictions as to specific results
would be speculative.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
81. See, e.g., 103 S. Ct. at 1013-14 (allowing claim for injunctive relief in
Robinson-Patman case).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
83. Id..
84. Id. § 15a.
[Vol. 49642
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ery to ordinary damages and the cost of suit, with no mention of attorney's
fees, when the United States is the plaintiff.
Since this language is mandatory,8 5 it appears that state and local govern-
ments may be sued for damages. The eleventh amendment,8 6 however, denies
federal jurisdiction in suits for damages where a state is a party. 7 Since the
antitrust laws grant exclusive federal jurisdiction, 88 an antitrust suit for dam-
ages against a state is effectively barred. The eleventh amendment protection
does not, however, apply to local governments.89 Given the mandatory lan-
guage of the antitrust damages provisions and the absence of a constitutional
bar, "judicial gymnastics" would be required to shelter local governments
from damage claims.90
As the preceding discussion indicates, the antitrust laws now apply to lo-
cal governments to nearly the same extent as private defendants. Although
state governments receive considerably more protection because of the state
action doctrine, they are by no means free from antitrust scrutiny. Moreover,
local governments face the threat of damages. 91 To decide whether this is de-
sirable, it is necessary to determine whether applying the antitrust laws to
state and local governments promotes the policies underlying the antitrust
laws.
The antitrust laws are designed to advance two basic policy objectives.
The first goal is based on the congressional determination that the needs of
society are best served by a competitive marketplace.92 The Sherman Act is
the premier example of Congress' desire to maintain such a marketplace.
93
Protection of small businesses, as exemplified by the Robinson-Patman Act,
9 4
is the second main policy objective.
By enacting antitrust exemptions for several specific industries,95 Con-
gress has acknowledged that the policies embodied in the antitrust laws do not
always promote the best interests of society. 6 The antitrust laws may thus be
85. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
87. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 185, 186 (1964) (eleventh amendment
bars suits against a state by its citizens as well as citizens of other states).
88. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1982).
89. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
90. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. 103 S. Ct. at 1014.
92. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
93. "Language more comprehensive is difficult to conceive. On its face it shows
a carefully studied attempt to bring within the [Sherman] Act every person engaged in
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse." United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
94. 103 S. Ct. at 1027 & n.7.
95. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C § 671 (1982) (milk marketing); id. § 608b (agricultural
producers); 15 U.S.C. § 522 (1982) (fishing industry).
96. The Court has also found implied exemptions because of pervasive federal
regulation. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357-61 (1963) (federal
securities laws provide basis for granting New York Stock Exchange implied antitrust
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thought of as general mandates for competition and the preservation of small
businesses while reserving exclusively to Congress the ability to decide when
other policy considerations are of sufficient magnitude to warrant an exemp-
tion. 97 There are obvious dangers in leaving these policy determinations to pri-
vate parties. The private sector may have neither the means nor the incentive
to determine when the policies of the antitrust laws are outweighed by alterna-
tive policy implications.
State and local governments, however, do have the means and incentive to
make these determinations. Indeed, the very purpose of state and local govern-
ments is to promote the interests of society.9 8 In some instances they may be
better equipped than Congress to make certain policy decisions because of
their superior knowledge of local conditions and their political accountability.
Where the interests of state and local governments parallel those of society,
the underlying objectives of the antitrust laws are not advanced by applying
them to those governments.
Consider the hypothetical town of Blackville which owns an electrical
power generating plant. Because Blackville can provide electricity to its resi-
dents much cheaper if it serves all of them, the city council prohibits anyone
else from selling electricity within the city. This is not alarming, because local
governments are expected to play a role in providing electricity to their inhabi-
tants. Moreover, if residents become displeased with the quality of service or
rate structure, they may elect a new administration. City officials thus have a
vested interest in carefully supervising their monopoly.
This is not to say that state and local governments should be completely
exempt from the antitrust laws. There may be cases where the interests of a
local government are in direct conflict with the interests of surrounding com-
munities. Assume the town of Bedrock is near Blackville. Bedrock buys elec-
tricity from a town on the opposite side of Blackville and, for a small fee,
Blackville allows the electricity to be wheeled over its lines.99 Realizing its
monopoly position10" and dwindling revenues, Blackville informs Bedrock that
it will no longer wheel power, but that it will gladly sell it at twice the price
Bedrock is now paying. This result is disturbing not simply because it is an
antitrust violation, 10 ' but because the government of Blackville made a deci-
sion to displace competition yet has no incentive to consider the harm to the
exemption).
97. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
685 n.7, 699 (1978) (association could not use public safety arguments to justify an-
ticompetitive bidding process).
98. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2 (purpose of government is to provide for
public welfare).
99. "Wheeling" is transmitting power from one utility to another over the lines
of a third company. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973).
100. Blackville has a monopoly in that it is the only means of wheeling power
from the third town to Bedrock.
101. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 368-72, 381-82.
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people of Bedrock. Since Blackville has no incentive to weigh the detrimental
effects of its anticompetitive policies, the reasons for not applying the antitrust
laws are no longer valid.
Jefferson County is an example of the second situation in which the rea-
sons for not applying the antitrust laws break down. The parties allegedly
seeking discriminatory prices in Jefferson County were the University of Ala-
bama and Cooper Green Hospital." 2 There is no apparent incentive for either
of these entities to consider the impact on private pharmaceutical retailers
before obtaining discriminatory prices. Moreover, even if such an incentive
were present, government hospital pharmacists have no means of evaluating
the economic and social impact of their actions. Legislative bodies, however,
are uniquely suited to this task. When other governmental agencies or
branches begin adopting anticompetitive policies, the justifications for a state
and local government antitrust exemption are no longer appropriate.
Deciding when the antitrust laws ought to apply to state and local govern-
ments is a difficult task. There are cases where there is no valid reason for
applying the antitrust laws to state and local governments. Zoning laws and
utility services are prime examples. In these situations, local governments have
both the means and the incentive to weigh the public benefits against the po-
tential anticompetitive effects. Moreover, these are the kinds of services resi-
dents expect local governments to provide.
There are other situations, however, where there are not clear reasons for
exempting state and local governments from the antitrust laws. The over-ag-
gressive utility10 3 and the retail oriented government 04 are illustrative. In
those cases, the government or governmental agency may have neither the
means nor the incentive to consider the anticompetitive effects of their actions.
Before attempting to draft a legislative proposal that will readily distinguish
these different situations, however, the remedial aspects of the antitrust laws
must be considered.
The previous discussion indicated that state and local governments should
not be entirely exempt from the antitrust laws. For this decision to have mean-
ing, there must be some form of remedy. At a minimum, the injured party
should be able to prevent the governmental unit from engaging in the violative
conduct. Thus, injunctive relief is appropriate against state and local govern-
ment antitrust defendants. Since this is the only remedy presently available
102. See note 8 supra.
103. In Lafayette, Louisiana Power & Light's (LP&L) counterclaim alleged
that the cities conspired to engage in sham litigation against LP&L to prevent or delay
construction of a nuclear power plant. LP&L also alleged that the cities required some
customers to purchase electricity as a condition of continued water and gas service. 435
U.S. at 392 n.6. Since this conduct bears little or no relationship to the cities' goal of
providing electricity to their inhabitants, it is difficult to justify exempting it from anti-
trust scrutiny.
104. 103 S. Ct. at 1027.
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against states, 106 there is no need to further limit the remedies a party may
seek against them. Moreover, since the current limitation is constitutional
there is no need, at least from a legislative perspective, to consider providing
more generous remedies against states.
Local governments, however, may be sued for treble damages and attor-
ney's fees' 06 as well as injunctive relief. Here, it may be helpful to determine
whether the policy considerations supporting treble damages against private
defendants are valid when applied to local governments.
Treble damages are punitive; they serve as a deterrent to potential anti-
trust violators and an incentive to potential plaintiffs. A strong argument can
be made that there is no need for such a deterrent effect with local govern-
ments. Treble damage awards can be tremendously large and, could seriously
burden most cities. Although an ambitious corporation might risk incurring
treble damages, the average city would not. Indeed, the threat of treble dam-
ages may make local legislators and governmental agencies overly cautious. 07
Where there is even a slight risk of treble damage liability, local policy makers
may refuse to attempt innovative social reform, particularly where the reform
would benefit only minority constituencies. 0 8 Thus, such a strong deterrent
effect is unnecessary with local government defendants and may prevent them
from implementing socially desirable, although potentially anticompetitive,
programs.
The plaintiff incentive justification for treble damages is not so easily dis-
missed. The antitrust laws should apply to local governments in some cases for
the same reasons they apply to private defendants; neither have the means nor
the incentive to weigh the social implications of their anticompetitive actions.
From a plaintiff's perspective it makes no difference whether the violator is a
private party or a governmental unit. If treble damages are necessary to en-
courage suits against private defendants, they must be equally necessary to
encourage suits against governmental defendants. Since the need for incentive
is the same, any treble damage exemption must be based on policy considera-
tions which are unique to local governments and which outweigh society's in-
terest in insuring that all meritorious antitrust claims are prosecuted.
A number of considerations weigh heavily in local governments' favor.
First is the strong deterrent effect discussed above. Citizens have come to ex-
105. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)
(eleventh amendment bars suits for damages against states).
106. 103 S. Ct. at 1032-33 n.22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. In view of the changes made by Boulder, cities may be even more cautious
because they are unsure what the current standards are.
108. Consider a city which sets rates for local ambulance services. Such an ar-
rangement would violate the antitrust laws. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940) (price fixing per se illegal). It may nevertheless
be socially desirable because it would ensure ambulance service at a reasonable price.
The poor, who would benefit most, may have the least political clout. Thus, under even
a slight risk of antitrust liability legislators might forego the program.
[Vol. 49646
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pect their cities to provide a wide variety of essential services. 10 9 The threat of
treble damages could affect a city's willingness to perform these services. A
second consideration in favor of local governments is that the relationship be-
tween a town and its citizens differs from the relationship between a corpora-
tion and its shareholders. Shareholders of a corporation benefit from the in-
creased profits of anticompetitive conduct, and they should be burdened when
the company violates the antitrust laws. There is no similar rationale for im-
posing treble damages on citizens, however, because they may receive no bene-
fit from antitrust violations by their city councils."x0 Further, a stockholder's
potential liability is limited to the amount of his investment, while a citizen's
potential liability would be virtually unlimited.""
The threat of treble damages may be used against local governments.
Even where a city is confident that a given program would not violate the
antitrust laws, it might abandon the program rather than risk the potential
expense of threatened litigation. Admittedly, this applies to private defendants
as well. The result is much more disturbing with respect to local governments,
however, because it directly interferes with the political processes.
Treble damages and the threat of treble damages may impair local gov-
ernments' ability to fulfill their dual function of administering public law and
providing public services.' 12 It is more important to prevent this impairment
and maintain access to local governments" 3 than to provide additional incen-
tives for private antitrust enforcement.
The policy considerations against awarding ordinary damages are basi-
cally the same as those against treble damages, differing only in degree. Local
governments would still be deterred, only not as much; innocent taxpayers
would still be penalized, but not as extensively; and the antitrust laws could
still be used as a lever, albeit a smaller one. The policy considerations in favor
of single damages are stronger than those for treble damages. Some form of
damages may be necessary for effective deterrence. Further, there would be
little incentive for private enforcement if plaintiffs could not recover even the
amount of their injuries. Single damages would have less effect upon local
governments' ability to fulfill their societal roles while providing the incentive
necessary to meaningful application of the antitrust laws. Therefore, they ap-
109. These services may include fire and police protection, public health, and
parks and recreation. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851 & n.16.
110. Taxpayers could benefit from a city's anticompetitive behavior. A city-
owned monopoly utility, for example, might benefit the entire community through
lower rates. In Jefferson County, however, it is extremely doubtful that all of the local
taxpayers took advantage of potentially lower prescription prices. It is difficult to jus-
tify imposing antitrust liability on those who either did not buy any prescription drugs
or bought elswhere.
111. The federal courts could presumably force local governments to issue judg-
ment bonds which, via the supremacy clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2, would preempt
any state or local limits on tax liability.
112. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851.
113. See note 108 supra.
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pear to be an appropriate remedy against local government defendants.
Local governments are currently liable for attorney's fees as well as dam-
ages. Attorney's fees have punitive as well as compensatory aspects.114 From
the defendant's perspective, attorney's fees are more like punitive damages be-
cause they represent costs beyond the gains reaped from the anticompetitive
conduct. From the plaintiff's perspective, however, attorney's fees are purely
compensatory because they represent the costs of recovering damages.
Although attorney's fees may be quite large in an antitrust suit,""5 they
will generally be much less than the damages sought. 1 6 Therefore, barring
recovery of fees will not eliminate the incentive for private enforcement. Fur-
ther, single damages alone are a sufficient antitrust deterrent for local
governments.
The preceding sections indicate that for various policy reasons, the anti-
trust laws should apply differently to state and local governments than private
parties. Moreover, this distinction is not reflected by the way the antitrust laws
are presently applied. The purpose of this section is to evaluate a current con-
gressional proposal in light of those policy considerations.
Senate bill 1578, the "Local Government Antitrust Act of 1983,"
provides:
The Federal antitrust laws shall not apply to any law or other action of,
or official action directed by, a city, village, town, township, county, or other
general function unit of local government in the exercise of its regulatory
powers, including but not limited to zoning, franchising, licensing, and the
establishment of monopoly public services, but excluding any activity involv-
ing the sale of goods or services by the unit of local government in competi-
tion with private persons, where such law or action is valid under state law,
except to the extent that the Federal antitrust laws would apply to a similar
law or action of, or official action directed by, a State. For purposes of this
section, the term "Federal antitrust laws" means the antitrust laws, as such
term is defined in the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12), and
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45).111
This bill is a significant step in the right direction. First, it recognizes
certain policy areas where local governments are capable of determining what
market structures best suit the need of local communities. It recognizes that
local governments often perform "organizing" functions, such as zoning and
licensing. By defining these areas as "regulatory powers", the bill provides a
114. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (bad faith of opponent may trigger
punitive award of attorney's fees).
115. Legal fees in one recent antitrust case were estimated at $500,000 per
month. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1977, at 41, col. 6.
116. In Lafayette, for example, the private utility's treble damage claim was over
$540 million. 435 U.S. at 440.
117. S. 1578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 9505-06 (1983). On Au-
gust 2, 1984, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill that exempts local gov-
ernments from antitrust damages liability.
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principled method for distinguishing an average municipally owned utility
from a utility which becomes overly aggressive toward its neighbors. Further,
in areas where local governments compete with private parties, the bill ensures
that any antitrust activity must be closely supervised by the government itself.
Thus, a governmental agency without the means or incentive to weigh the an-
ticompetitive effects of its policies would still be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
Although the bill is titled "Local Government Act of 1983," it also has
some implications for state governments because it represents at least a de
facto congressional adoption of the state action doctrine. While the courts
have been applying the state action doctrine for over forty years, it does send a
message to the courts that Congress endorses the doctrine. Hence, the courts
will be very hesitant to narrow its application, a result which is potentially
important in light of waning tenth amendment protections."'
Senate Bill 1578 adequately defines when local governments should be
exempt from the antitrust laws. It is deficient, however, in addressing what
remedies are appropriate in those cases where the antitrust laws should apply.
By failing to deal with this issue, the bill effectively condones the imposition of
treble damages suggested by Boulder and Jefferson County.
Senate Bill 1578 would greatly enhance local governments' ability to per-
form their functions in society. Congress will not have fully addressed the
problems of applying the antitrust laws to local governments, however, until it
limits potential recovery to single damages. Moreover, the bill would continue
to allow antitrust scrutiny in cases such as Jefferson County where anticompe-
titive decisions are made apart from the legislative process and by b'odies with
neither the means nor the incentive to weigh the social implications of their
conduct.
MICHAEL S. SHIPLEY
118. See text accompanying notes 15-47 supra (in light of recent Supreme Court
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